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From Mental Holism to the Soul and Back 
Mark Textor 
 
Abstract: In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt Brentano proposed a view 
of consciousness that neither has room nor need for a subject of mental acts, a soul. 
Later he changed his mind: there is a soul that appears in consciousness. In this paper 
I will argue that Brentano’s change of view is not justified. The subjectless view of 
consciousness can be defended against Brentano’s argument and it is superior to its 
predecessor. 
 
1. Introduction 
Descartes famously reported that in introspection he was aware of a simple substance, 
a soul or self. In his Treatise Hume, equally famously, countered: 
 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a 
perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (Hume 1739/40, 
252) 
 
In Hume’s introspection no mental substance is given, only perceptions are.1  
In his Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt (1874) Brentano found 
himself in agreement with Hume: 
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Neither sensation nor inner perception presents us with a substance. Just as in 
sensation we encounter the phenomena of warmth, colour and sound, we 
encounter in inner perception the phenomena of thinking, feeling and willing. 
An entity which has them as properties we don’t encounter. It is a fiction, 
which has no reality at all or, if it existed, its existence could not be certified. 
(Brentano 1874 I, 15-16 [8]; my translation)2 
 
Consciousness or inner perception presents us with activities such as thinking and 
feeling, but not an active subject. Brentano goes on to say that the soul is a fiction. 
This is an over-statement. A soul may not be an object of experience, yet it may be an 
object of whose existence we convince ourselves by an inference to the best 
explanation.  
However, it took Brentano just a few years to make a complete u-turn. In his 
manuscript ‘Von der Seele’ (‘On the Soul’) one can read:3 
 
1. I take a soul to be a substance whose accidents are the mental activities of 
the man. I call those accidents mental activities that are directed upon an 
object or, in Descartes’ terminology, thinking something. 
2. The existence of the activities is self-evident and will hardly be denied by a 
sensible person. In contrast some people think that they show particular 
scientific exactness when they dispute the legitimacy of conceiving of these 
activities as accidents of a substance.  
 
When we say that you, a human being, see a rose, it is really a substance connected to 
the human being that has seeing a rose as an accident. Why does Brentano now side 
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with Descartes against Hume? Is the change justified? In this essay I will answer 
these questions and in answering them shed light on Brentano’s ontology that 
underlies his view of consciousness. 
 I will proceed by first motivating Brentano’s Mental Holism that has neither 
room nor need for a mental substance. The central claim of Mental Holism is that at 
any time one has only one presentation of which simultaneous seeing, hearing etc. are 
different ‘sides’ that can be distinguished only by abstraction (§§ 2 – 6). While 
Mental Holism is an attractive position, there is a main obstacle for it: simultaneous 
mental acts seem separable and therefore distinct (§ 7). Brentano responded to this 
problem by giving up Mental Holism and reintroducing the soul. Simultaneous mental 
acts are unified at a time by being accidents, particularized properties, of one and the 
same substance, a soul (§ 8). I will argue that the introduction of a soul does not solve 
the problem under consideration (§9). The soul is also not an object of experience as 
Brentano claimed (§§ 10 – 11). Since the introduction of the soul does not allow us to 
make progress, I will revisit the examples that are supposed to make the separability 
of simultaneous mental acts plausible. I will argue that they are compatible with 
Mental Holism (§ 12). Mental Holism should not easily be abandoned in favour of the 
soul theory. 
 
2. Perceiving Some Things Together 
When Brentano developed his theory of consciousness in chapters II and III of the 
second book of Psychologie, he considered one mental act, hearing a tone, in 
isolation. This is, as he stressed later, a simplification intended to ease the discussion 
of other features: 
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In reality, such a simple state never occurs. It frequently happens, instead, 
that we have a rather large number of objects before our minds 
simultaneously, with which we enter into many diverse relations of 
consciousness. (Brentano 1874 I, 221 [120]) 
 
The standard case is that we are directed on many diverse objects at the same time. 
Singular intentionality is a limiting case that is never realised. Consider an example 
that brings out the intuition Brentano appealed to. Tye imagines himself to be a ship 
passenger: 
 
Standing by the railing of a ship and smelling the sea air, as I look at the ship’s 
wake in the ocean, I hear the sound of a tugboat from afar. Intuitively, it is not 
simply that I have an experience of a vivid blue color and also an experience 
of a salty smell and further an experience of a booming sound. Color, smell, 
and sound are experienced together; there is, as it were, a seamless 
phenomenal whole within which these qualities are phenomenologically 
present. (Tye 2007, 289-90) 
 
The passenger on the ship is simultaneously aware of a plurality of physical objects, 
colours, sounds, etc., together.  
Brentano coined a number of different terms to cover different kinds of joint 
mental uptake of several things: 
 
 A ist miterfasst [co-apprehended] (1874 I, 182 [100]) 
 A ist mitgegeben [co-given] (1874 I, 181 [99]) 
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 A ist mitanerkannt [co-acknowledged] (1890/1, 34 [36]) 
 A is mitempfunden [co-sensed] (1890/1, 23 [26]) 
 A is mitgeliebt [co-loved] (1907, 148) 
 
Brentano’s ‘mit erfasst’ is modelled on compound German verbs with ‘mit’ such as 
‘mitgefangen’. If a fisherman throws out his net, he may co-catch (mitfangen) things 
he did not intend to catch. These things are the bycatch (Beifang). The bycaught 
things are caught together with the fish in one throw of the net. Brentano has cases in 
mind where one acknowledges, loves etc. some things together, although one does not 
acknowledge, love etc. each of them in isolation. Consider as an example co-loving.4 
Imagine that you love the taste of Parmesan cheese, but not its smell. If you go on 
using Parmesan in the kitchen, says Brentano, you co-love its sweet taste and you co-
love its smell. For you prefer them to their absence. But it is not the case that you love 
the sweet taste and you love the smell: you hate the smell. You only love the smell 
together with the taste because you can’t have the taste without the smell. 
 
3. Mental Atomism and Holism  
When you perceive some things together, is your joint perception composed of 
several perceivings each of which is directed on a particular object, say a tone?  
Mental Atomists answer this question with YES. Hume is a paradigmatic 
example. Just as there are physical atoms, there are mental atoms, impressions and 
ideas. Ideas are representations in their own right: ‘ideas always represent their 
objects or impressions’ (Hume 1739/40, 1.3.14.6). There are no necessary 
connections between mental atoms. They exist independently of each other. Their 
behaviour is governed by causal laws. Joint awareness is some mental atoms 
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‘operating together’.  
In Psychologie Brentano answered the question above with NO. He called his 
own view ‘unity of consciousness’: 
 
The unity of consciousness, as it can be recognized with evidence from what 
we perceive in inner perception, consists in the fact that all mental phenomena 
which occur within us simultaneously such as seeing and hearing, thinking, 
judging and reasoning, loving and hating, desiring and shunning, etc., no 
matter how different they may be, all belong to one unitary reality already if 
they are inwardly perceived as existing together [wenn sie nur als 
zusammenbestehend innerlich wahrgenommen werden]. They are partial 
phenomena that make up one mental phenomenon [als Teilphänomene ein 
psychisches Phänomen ausmachen], the elements of which are neither distinct 
things nor parts of distinct things but belong to a real unity. This is what is 
necessary for the unity of consciousness, and no further conditions are 
required. (Brentano 1874 I, 232 [126])5 
 
Let us go back to Tye’s example of a joint perception to unpack Brentano’s idea. If 
we are simultaneously aware of colours, sounds, smells etc. we can also be jointly 
aware of our simultaneous seeing, hearing, smelling etc. If we are jointly aware of 
these activities, argued Brentano, they form one mental phenomenon; consciousness 
at a time is one unit. Brentano’s basic claim is: 
 
If one is co-aware of some simultaneous mental activities, these are parts of 
one consciousness. 
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Prima facie, this view is not distinct from Atomism: Brentano and Mental Atomists 
agree that one’s consciousness at a time has a multitude of parts. However, they 
disagree about the nature of these parts. According to Brentano, if we are jointly 
aware of seeing, hearing, tasting etc., these activities are conceptual parts of a single 
mental act or presentation. According to the Atomists, these activities are real parts, 
mental acts that exist prior to the whole and that are directed on objects. Let us get 
clear about the difference by sharpening our understanding of the notion of a 
conceptual part. 
Already in his On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, Brentano argued 
that there are conceptual divisions to which no real difference corresponds, because 
‘the understanding [Verstand], in considering something, often divides into different 
concepts what is in itself one’ (Brentano 1862, 131 [86]). The action Brutus’s 
stabbing of Caesar is the same event as the murder of Caesar, conceptualised 
differently: once in terms of agent (Brutus), once in terms of the unfortunate patient 
(Caesar) of the action. Similarly, when one talks or thinks about hearing a note, one 
brings something that ‘is in itself one’ under one partial concept, when one talks or 
thinks about consciousness of hearing a note, one brings the same thing under a 
different partial concept. Consider Brentano’s simplified model: consciously hearing 
a note: 
 
The presentation of the tone and the presentation of the presentation of the 
tone form one single mental phenomenon, it is only by considering it in its 
relation to two different objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and 
the other a mental phenomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two 
presentations. (Brentano 1874 I, 176–9 [97–8]; my emphasis, in part my 
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translation) 
 
Consciously hearing a tone is not a combination of two prior mental acts each of 
which has causal powers and intentionality. It is one unit that can be brought under 
two different partial concepts and thereby a conceptual division is effected.  
Brentano said in the quote above that one can bring a mental act under 
different concepts ‘only by considering it in its relation to two different objects’. 
Which objects? He distinguished between ‘immanent object’ or the ‘intentional 
correlate’ of a mental act and real object.6 Every mental act is supposed to have an 
intentional correlate, but some mental acts lack a real object. Take a case of auditory 
hallucination. When it merely seems to me that F is sounding now, there is an answer 
to the question ‘What does appear to you now?’; this answer specifies the immanent 
object. One cannot be directed on something without being directed on it in a 
particular way. Hence, there is no mental act without an intentional correlate, but the 
intentional correlate of an act is not itself the object of the mental. The immanent 
object is rather a mode of presentation, a way in which something is given to us. The 
real object is the object that is, in the good case, given under this mode of 
presentation. 
We have a choice now: do the conceptual distinctions that one makes when 
one divides one activity in, for example, seeing and consciousness draw on the real 
objects or the immanent ones? Brentano himself was not explicit on this point. His 
student Marty, however, makes clear that the immanent objects are relevant for the 
conceptual division: 
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Someone who admits that simultaneously tones, colours and smells 
intentionally dwell in us [intentional einwohnen] cannot without contradiction 
deny that our activity of consciousness shows a plurality of subactivities and 
that in this sense a number of subactivities, sensations and thoughts is in us, a 
‘manifold of co-existing ideas’ can in no sense be a mere chimaera. […] 
(Marty 1892, 141-2; my translation) 
 
It suffices for an activity to be conceptually complex to have several intentionally in-
existing objects, that is, immanent objects. If it has several immanent objects, it can 
be brought under different partial concepts and is therefore conceptually complex. 
Marty added an important point: 
 
But it would indeed be wrong to take these or the parts or sides of our 
simultaneous mental state that we mentioned earlier as a collective similar to a 
group of atoms or as a result of the states of such a group. And in this sense 
there can in fact be no earlier or later recurrence of an idea as if there were an 
individual that disappears from consciousness and returns later. (ibid.) 
  
For Brentano and his followers our consciousness at a time has conceptual, but not 
real parts. The term ‘sides’ is used to signal that the parts of a mental act are not 
mental acts that each have causal powers and reference. A side of a polygon is not an 
object that exists prior to the polygon and the polygon is not composed of its sides. 
Stumpf explicitly warned his readers that talk of parts is not to be taken literally in the 
realm of the mental: 
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Even the simultaneous presence of several elements in the same consciousness 
is a metaphor, a hypostatisation of the elements. We have one state in which 
we can distinguish by abstraction different sides. (Stumpf 1906/7, 235; my 
translation) 
 
Let’s get clear about the talk of ‘distinguish by abstraction different sides’ by 
considering an independent example of an act that has several objects. If I kill two 
birds, Tweety and Sparky, with one stone (throw), my killing Tweety is the same 
action as my killing Sparky.7 But I don’t need to do two things to kill Tweety and 
Sparky. The fact that one action satisfies the description ‘my killing of Tweety’ as 
well as the description ‘my killing of Sparky’ does not require that it can be 
decomposed into two subacts. In this case talk of two killings or one complex killing 
composed of subacts is a hypostatisation. If we make a distinction between killing 
Tweety and killing Sparky, we merely register that ONE act has several objects. 
In general, if one act has several objects, it satisfies several partial 
descriptions. In giving such a description one makes an abstraction in one of the 
literal senses of ‘abstraction’: one describes is ‘abstracting’ from some of its 
properties and relations. For example, to abstract a property is ‘to present it to the 
mind apart from the other properties that usually go along with it in nature’ (Bain 
quoted in OED entry). An abstraction is a partial conception of something in that it 
leaves something out. 8 
This idea can now be applied to mental acts. When we are co-conscious of 
colours, smells, sounds etc., there is one presentation of them. This presentation 
satisfies different partial descriptions, such as ‘my hearing F’, ‘my seeing blue’, etc. 
For our purposes the important point is that the reference of the presentation is not a 
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function of the reference of the abstract ‘parts’ one can distinguish in it. One can 
distinguish abstract parts – Brentano calls them ‘divisives’ or ‘distinctional parts’ – 
because the presentation has multiple objects. It is also the basis for forming the 
designations of mental acts in the first place. 
If our consciousness has only conceptual parts, its reference, the objects it is 
directed on, cannot be determined by its composition of mental acts that each have a 
reference. Compare a list name such as ‘John, Paul, Ringo and George’. It is a 
combination of semantic atoms: ‘John’, ‘Paul’, ‘Ringo’ and ‘George’ each of which 
refers to one person. The list name refers to several people because it combines the 
independent ‘atoms’ ‘John’, ’Paul’, ‘Ringo’ and George’ in a particular way. 
Atomists take our consciousness at a time to be like a list name: it is the result of a 
combination of independent atoms each of which refers to one particular thing. In 
contrast, Holists take our consciousness at a time to be similar to plural reference 
without syntactic complexity. Imagine that you point to the Beatles and say 
 
These are 4 of the greatest musicians. 
 
The demonstrative ‘these’ refers to John, Paul, Ringo and George, but it has no 
identifiable syntactic parts each of which refers to only one object. Yet, it is right to 
say that ‘these’ refers to Paul, among other people. Here we bring a simple term under 
a partial semantic concept. When we say that hearing F is going on we bring a mental 
simple under a particular partial concept.  
To sum up: For the Atomist the parts of consciousness at a time are (i) prior to 
the whole and (ii) some of the atoms are mental acts. Therefore the mental reference 
of the whole can depend on the reference of the atoms. For Brentano, the parts of 
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consciousness at a time are conceptual parts, that is, they are different partial concepts 
that apply to one mental act. Consequently, the mental reference of the whole cannot 
depend on the reference of the atoms. There are no atoms. I will call Brentano’s view 
Mental Holism because it gives explanatory priority to the whole.  
 As we have seen in § 1 in Psychologie Brentano took ‘my soul’ or ‘my self’ to 
be vacuous singular terms. Mental Holism complements this view. This connection is 
nicely brought out by Parfit: 
 
Just as there can be single memory of just having had three experiences, such 
as hearing a bell strike three times, there can be a single state of awareness 
both of hearing the fourth striking of this bell, and of seeing ravens fly past the 
bell-tower. Reductionist claim that nothing more is involved in the unity of 
consciousness at a single time. Since there can be one state of awareness of 
several experiences, we need not explain this unity by ascribing these 
experiences to the same person, or subject of experiences. (Parfit 1986, 250-1) 
 
A seeing and a hearing are not parts of one consciousness because they are activities 
of the same subject or soul. Rather a seeing and a hearing are conceptual parts of one 
consciousness if, and only if, they are co-conscious. A soul is neither experienced nor 
is it needed to conceptualise an important fact about our conscious life.  
 
5. Mental Holism and Monism 
If one adds a further premise to Brentano’s key-assumption 
 
If one is co-aware of some mental activities, these are conceptual parts of a 
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metaphysically simple mental act 
 
namely: 
 
 One is co-aware of all mental activities that one undergoes at a time 
 
one arrives at Mental Monism. At any time there is only one mental act. In the 
unpublished third volume of Psychologie Brentano seems to endorse Mental Monism: 
 
The totality of our simultaneous mental activities and therefore all our 
simultaneous presenting belongs to one and the same reality. Everything we 
present can therefore in one sense be taken to be the content of one 
presentation that contains in itself a plurality of parts. (Brentano, PS 53, 
53015, 20) 
 
However, the additional premise is controversial. Marty considered cases where 
hypnosis brings about something similar to what are now known as ‘split-brain’ cases. 
In such a case, the left brain-hemisphere generates an experience as of a green spot on 
the left, the right brain-hemisphere generates an experience as of a red spot on the 
right, but there is no joint awareness of a green and red spot. Marty described these 
cases as follows: 
 
If this were the case, it would not contradict our concept of the unity of 
consciousness. Each of these consciousnesses would be one unity. (Marty 
2011, 32) 
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Take Brentano’s use of ‘we’ [‘our’] in the quote above. If ‘we’ refers to human 
animals like us, a human animal might suffer from split-brain syndrome. In this case 
not all its simultaneous mental acts are conceptual parts of one act. Some are 
conceptual parts of one act; others are parts of another act. If ‘we’ refers to soul, a 
non-physical bearer of mental properties, it is at least not clear why a soul should not 
have several ‘consciousnesses’. However, more often than not, there will be a one-to-
one correlation between human animals and consciousnesses at a time. In the 
following section I will focus on Mental Holism, and not on Mental Monism, since 
the latter claim is based on empirical assumptions. 
 
6. Brentano’s Epistemic Argument  
So far we have clarified the main tenets of Mental Holism. It remains to answer the 
question ‘Why accept Mental Holism?’ Brentano gave in Psychologie (Book 2, iv, 
§2) a number of arguments for the conclusion that at a time co-conscious mental acts 
are conceptual parts of one act. The gist of these arguments can be conveyed by an 
analogy: If you know that p and I know that q, there is not one thinker who knows 
that p and q. For this to be the case, the knowledge has to be shared by one single 
mind. Similarly, being conscious of a and being conscious of b does not amount to 
consciousness of a and b, if there is not one single consciousness of a and b. The 
defect of this kind of argument is that it leaves open the possibility that distinct 
consciousness collaborate: being conscious of a and b might be a property distinct 
things have together or collectively, but not individually. 
 After Psychologie Brentano changed tack. In his manuscript ‘On the Soul’ he 
outlined a different argument that seems more promising. I will quote most of the first 
page of the manuscript because it is so far neither published nor translated. He 
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continued after the passage quoted in the introduction: 
 
3. That ‘thinking, feeling, willing, seeing, hearing thing’ says something 
substantive [Wesenhaftes] is obvious. If they were not to pertain to other 
substantive things, they would be substantive beings in their own right. In 
other words, they would be substances in the ancient Greek sense. […] 
4. One cannot assume that there is one single unitary ousia [substance] if one 
would simultaneously hear and see. For the one ceases while the other 
continues. We had to talk in line with Hume of a bundle that is composed out 
of many substances.  
5. Yet what counts against this is [P2] that hearing and seeing fall with self-
evidence into the same consciousness. And this consciousness in its self-
evidence has a further reach. A whole chain of thought, a far reaching plan, 
are within its reach. 
The self-evidence of perceiving would be impossible without its [perceiving’s] 
essential unity with the perceiver. The relation between the perceived real 
object and the perceiver could be merely the relation of cause and effect. 
Descartes already showed that where this [is the case], the possibility of an 
evidence does not exist. God could, he said, in any case cause all that which 
the external object causes. 
6. Therefore self-evidence requires a more intimate relation [than causation] 
between perceiver and perceived [P3]. Are they perhaps only conceptually 
different, but the same thing? – This seems to contradict the idea that under 
this assumption hearing and seeing were also merely conceptually different 
when they occurred simultaneously in us. But this is incompatible with the 
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fact that they can start and cease to exist independently of each other. 
(Brentano LS 1b.) 
 
 In 3. and 4. Brentano introduces Humean Atomism: joint seeing and hearing is 
a complex of distinct mental acts. Seeing and hearing are not just conceptual parts, 
but real parts. They are acts that have objects and causal powers.  
In 5. and the beginning of 6. Brentano suggests an argument against Humean 
Atomism and for Mental Holism. At the end of 6. Brentano outlines a challenge for 
Mental Holism. Consider an example to make the challenge vivid. Some simultaneous 
mental acts like Fred’s tasting the cheese and Fred’s hearing the Bach cantata seem 
separable: one can occur without the other. Brentano took this to be a conclusive 
reason to take Fred’s tasting the cheese and Fred’s hearing the Bach cantata to be two 
distinct acts in their own right and not conceptual parts of one act. I will call this 
problem for Holism the Separability Challenge. How can seeing and hearing be 
conceptual parts of one act, and yet be separable? Brentano rejected Holism because 
he could see no way to meet the Separability Challenge. Before addressing this 
challenge, let’s see whether Brentano has a good argument for Mental Holism. 
The argument suggested by Brentano in 5. and 6. above can be spelled out 
further as follows: 
 
Brentano’s Epistemic Argument: 
 
(P1) Consciousness is immediately evident acknowledgement of mental 
acts. 
(P2) Sometimes we acknowledge several simultaneous mental acts such as 
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seeing and hearing with immediate evidence.  
(P3) Immediate evidence requires the identity of the judgement and its 
subject-matter. 
Hence: (C) Consciousness of simultaneous mental acts and these acts are 
identical. 
 
I take the premises in order. 
 
First (P1): Inner consciousness is immediately evident acknowledgement of 
mental acts. What is immediately evident acknowledgement? An 
acknowledgement is immediately evident only if it is infallible knowledge, that is, 
if the acknowledgement could not exist without its object, and there neither is, nor 
need to be, a justifying reason for it. The claim that inner consciousness is 
immediately evident is highly plausible. For what could be a reason that justifies 
or warrants consciousness of my present mental acts? When I am conscious of my 
seeing, I have immediate knowledge of it that is not in need of an independent 
warrant. Is it possible that my consciousness of seeing is mistaken? Intuitively, the 
answer is no. 
It might seem that there is an initial problem with Brentano’s claim that 
awareness is immediately evident that already arises for immediately evident 
knowledge of single acts. What is seeing? 
 
Seeing is having a coloured thing as an object, … (Brentano 1954, 191; my 
translation.) 
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Seeing is having a coloured thing as an object, hearing is having a sound as an 
object. But how can awareness of seeing be infallible with respect to the existence 
of the colour seen? This problem is immediately resolved if we bear in mind the 
distinction between the primary object and the intentional correlate. When I am 
aware of seeing red, I immediately and infallibly know what I see: the intentional 
correlate or immanent object (see section 2). The same awareness constitutes 
knowledge of the primary object of seeing, the red expanse, if the seeing is 
veridical; otherwise we have only knowledge of what we see. Awareness is 
fallible with respect to the primary object: 
 
Just as someone acknowledges immediately himself as seeing, he 
acknowledges also something seen, and he does not merely acknowledge 
something seen by him (for this is the necessary correlate of himself as 
seeing), but something real, for instance a spatially extended red. But in 
doing so he judges blindly. The existence of the real red is not immediately 
evident. Immediately evident is only his existence as someone seeing red 
and the red as something seen by him. (Brentano 1890/1, 158 [167]; my 
translation) 
 
In the good case my awareness of seeing red is immediate infallible knowledge of 
the perceiving and of its intentional correlate – denoted by ‘what is seen by me’ – 
and fallible knowledge the real object, say a red expanse.  
 
Then (P2): Sometimes we acknowledge several simultaneous mental acts such as 
seeing and hearing with immediate evidence. Brentano puts this in metaphorical terms 
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when he writes that ‘hearing and seeing fall with evidence into the same 
consciousness’. I take this to be an important insight. When discussing the distinctive 
kind of knowledge we have of our present mental life, philosophers have mainly 
focused on the knowledge of one mental activity. Brentano takes the scope of 
awareness to be wider. We have immediately evident knowledge of several 
simultaneous mental acts. Consider again a situation in which you simultaneously see 
and hear. You can with immediate evidence know of your seeing and hearing. You 
may not know with immediate evidence of your seeing and know with immediate 
evidence of your hearing. But because you simultaneously see and hear you can know 
of these activities together with immediate evidence. You can know of these activities 
with immediate evidence, although you can’t distinguish or describe them, as long as 
they are together differentiated from other activities. Indeed it seems easier and more 
basic to acknowledge some things together than one thing in isolation.  
Brentano often described this in mereological terms. Simultaneous mental acts 
are given to us as one whole: 
 
We emphasized as a distinguishing characteristic the fact that the mental 
phenomena which we perceive, in spite of all their multiplicity, always appear 
to us as a unity, while physical phenomena, which we perceive at the same 
time, do not all appear in the same way as parts of one single phenomenon. 
(Brentano 1874 I, 137 [75])9 
 
If we are always jointly aware of many things, it is difficult to attend to one of them in 
particular. If many things are simultaneously given, it requires extra mental effort to 
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pick out one of these things in particular. Hence, we are prone to make mistakes as 
Brentano explained later in the second edition of Psychologie: 
 
Inner perception is confused […] and although this imperfection does not affect 
its evidence, it has caused many mistakes. (Brentano 1874 II, 141 [216]; my 
translation.) 
 
‘Confused’ contrasts with ‘distinct’: we are aware of some mental acts, but not 
distinctly in the sense that each of them is given to us in perception. We need to 
compare and contrast our mental acts with each other to make them distinct. This 
activity is not immune to error. Only our acknowledgement of these activities 
together is immune to error. 
 
Finally (P3): The immediate evidence of inner perception ‘requires essential unity 
of perceiver and the object perceived’. Brentano supported (P3) with a further 
consideration: 
 
One can now show that such an immediate knowledge of a fact is only 
thinkable if the knower and the known stand in the relation of identity. 
While the known is not absolutely necessary, but only known as a mere 
fact, it is obvious that it has to persist as long as the evident perceiving 
directed on it. For otherwise there would be the contradiction of an evident 
and false judgement. Hence, what we come to know as a mere fact is 
known as relatively necessary. This would be unthinkable if what is known 
were not identical with the knower because, of the two independent 
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objects, one could cease to and the other persist unaltered without 
contradiction. (Brentano 1954, 228; my translation) 
 
This quote is helpful, but it is also in need of explanation. If Brentano’s conclusion 
were really that the knower and the known are the same, this would constitute a 
reductio ad absurdum of one of Brentano’s premises. For when I know with 
immediate evidence of my pain, I am neither identical with my pain nor with the 
state of affairs that there is pain. Brentano’s claim, charitably understood, is that 
awareness of a mental act can only be immediately evident if awareness of the 
mental act and the act are the same.  
Why is this supposed to be the case? Consciousness is immediately evident 
acknowledgement (symbolised as ‘Je’ below). An immediately evident 
acknowledgement guarantees the existence of its object: 
 
 Nec. (∃!Je(a) → ∃!a.) 
 
When I acknowledge with immediate evidence seeing and hearing together at a 
time t, it must be the case at t that seeing and hearing are going on. So the 
contingent existence of one object, the judgement, necessitates the existence of 
some other objects (and vice versa).  
But how can there be a necessary relation between distinct contingent 
existences? 10 It seems deeply puzzling that one thing should be able to necessitate 
the existence of another. 
One response to this puzzlement is to argue that the things under 
consideration are not completely distinct, but one ‘contributes to the being of the 
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other’. Siewert gives a good illustration of this strategy: 
 
I might deny that the referent of my demonstrative causes my thought 
about it – not on the grounds of epiphenomenalism – but rather, on the 
grounds that the referent of ‘this,’ the experience I refer to, and my 
thinking that this is a painful feeling, are not wholly distinct events, such 
as may be causally related. I would say the occurrence of my thinking that 
this is a painful feeling could not have happened without the experience it 
is about, for that experience is itself a constituent of the event which is my 
thinking – the thinking about the experience is not an event separable from 
the experience thought about. (Siewert 2001, 554) 
 
My consciousness of my current pain could not exist without its object. However, 
if we take the consciousness of my pain and my pain to be numerically distinct, 
we have an unexplained necessary connection between contingent ‘distinct 
existences’. Siewert tries to explain this necessary connection away in terms of a 
constituency relation: the pain is a constituent of the consciousness.  
But do we have an independently plausible account of this constituency 
relation? In general, wholes other than mereological sums may have different 
constituents. An orchestra is composed at different times of different musicians. 
Hence, the whole may exist without the parts that actually make it up. If we want 
to allow for immediate evidence in terms of constituency, we need to assume that 
it is impossible that the whole has other parts than the ones it actually has. This 
introduces a new unexplained necessary connection between distinct contingent 
existences.11  
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Brentano pursued a different strategy: there is no necessary relation 
between distinct existences, because there are no distinct existences. There is only 
one mental act that is conceived of under different modes or presentation. 
Awareness of seeing blue and hearing F, seeing blue and hearing F are only 
conceptually different, but really identical. Hence, we arrive at the conclusion: 
 
(C) Consciousness of simultaneous mental acts and these acts are identical. 
 
Brentano’s conclusion provides him with a relation between consciousness and its 
objects that is compatible with the immediate evidence of the former: identity.12 If 
one does not want to assume unexplained necessary relations between distinct 
contingent existences, identity seems to be the best bet for the relation between the 
immediately evident judgement and its object. They are the same thing conceived 
of under different concepts. 
Does Brentano’s argument lead to the unwelcome consequence that all 
immediately evident judgements are identical with their subject-matter? This 
would be a reductio ad absurdum since, for instance, the immediately evident 
judgement that 1 = 1 cannot be identical with the fact that 1 = 1. But the obvious 
fact that 1 = 1 can obtain without anybody making the corresponding judgement. 
Hence, it can’t be identical to such a judgement. There is no possible world in 
which we make the judgement that 1 = 1 and it is not the case that 1 = 1, although 
judgement and fact judged are distinct existences. If at least one of the ‘distinct 
existences’ necessarily obtains, there is no need to explain the necessary 
connection away. 
 Brentano’s Modus Ponens is Armstrong’s Modus Tollens. In his 
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Materialist Theory of the Mind Armstrong argued that the analogue of the 
awareness of our mental acts is a mechanism that scans its own internal states. 
Armstrong continues: 
 
It is clear here that the operation of scanning and the situation scanned 
must be ‘distinct existences’. A machine can scan itself only in the same 
sense that a man can eat himself. (Armstrong 1968, 107) 
 
I can only eat myself by eating a part of me, say my leg, and my leg is not me. A 
machine can only scan itself by scanning a part of itself. Hence, (C) is false and 
therefore awareness cannot be immediately evident.  
Armstrong’s criticism sheds light on Brentano’s position. For Brentano 
and his students this shows that there is no reason to think of awareness as the 
scanning of mental states. We can reflect and observe our mental acts. This might 
fruitfully be thought of as an internal scanning. But awareness is supposed to be 
different from reflection and observation. Armstrong’s criticism brings out the 
importance of the distinction between awareness and observation. 
 
7. The Separability Challenge 
If joint seeing and hearing are different sides of one act, they are not separable. 
However, it seems highly plausible that they are separable and therefore not-identical. 
In Psychologie Brentano was aware of this Separability Challenge, but dodged it: 
 
This assumption [the unity of consciousness] has its difficulties. If all 
simultaneous mental acts never were anything but divisives of one and the 
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same unified thing, how could one of them be independent of another one? 
And yet this is the case: neither in their coming nor in their ceasing to be are 
they tied to each other. Consider, for instance, hearing and seeing: sometimes 
the first occurs without the second and the second without the first, and if they 
exist simultaneously, one perhaps goes out of existence while the other 
continues to exist. (Brentano 1874 I, 224 [122]; in part my translation) 
 
If hearing and seeing are distinct existences, they are not divisives of one 
presentation. Hence, Brentano can no longer answer the question ‘What is the relation 
between seeing, hearing and consciousness of seeing and hearing that allows for the 
immediate evidence of the latter?’ by saying that the acts involved are divisives or 
sides of one presentation. A new answer is needed that is compatible with the fact that 
seeing and hearing are distinct. We need a relation between (i) hearing F, (ii) seeing 
blue, and (iii) the awareness of hearing F and seeing blue that is compatible with 
numerical difference between (i)—(iii), yet allows (iii) to be immediately evident 
with respect to (i) and (ii).  
 
8. Brentano’s Response to the Separability Challenge 
The relation we are looking for, Brentano proposed, is the relation of a substance to 
its accidents, the properties that are particularized by it.  
 In general, a substance is something that has properties, but is not the property 
of anything.13 More precisely, a substance has properties, but it is impossible that it is  
had by something as a property. A substance can, but need not remain the same in 
changes; there are fleeting substances. For example, Brentano took colour patches to 
be substances. If there is something that ‘performs’ mental activities such as seeing, 
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hearing, thinking, willing etc. as accidents without itself being a mental activity, it is a 
mental substance. A self is a soul that has one accident that is directed upon the soul 
whose accident it is.14 Mental Holism dispensed with mental substances and selves: at 
any time there is one mental act that has many objects, among them itself. But the 
mental act is not an accident of a mental substance.  
How is the introduction of a mental substance supposed to address the 
Separability Challenge? We need first the notion of substantial identity. If two distinct 
accidents are instantiated in the same substance, they are substantially identical. 
Substantial identity is not a relation between a substance and itself, but a relation 
between accidents. Awareness of ϕ-ing and ϕ-ing are both accidents. Brentano argued 
that awareness of ϕ-ing is immediately evident if, and only if, awareness of ϕ-ing and 
ϕ-ing are substantially identical.15 This idea allows (i) hearing F, (ii) seeing blue, and 
(iii) the awareness of hearing F and seeing blue to be distinct and separable. But the 
fact that (i)—(iii) inhere in the same soul, argues Brentano, makes it possible that (iii) 
is an evident acknowledgement of (i) and (ii). 
Evident acknowledgement is supposed to be infallible. Hence, it is not 
possible that awareness of hearing F and seeing blue exists without hearing F and 
seeing blue existing. The introduction of a mental substance would help to meet the 
Separability Challenge only if substantially identical accidents stood in necessary 
relations to each other. However, in general, there is no necessary relation between 
different accidents of the same substance. For illustration assume that I am a 
substance. I am hungry and thirsty at the same time, but I might have been hungry and 
tired, but not thirsty at that time. If there is no necessary relation between the 
accidents of a substance, awareness of seeing and hearing and seeing and hearing can 
be accidents of the same substance, yet the former may exist while the latter doesn’t. 
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Therefore substantial sameness between a mental act and awareness of it does not 
underwrite the immediate evidence of awareness. So substantial identity does not pull 
its weight in the theory of consciousness.  
To sum up: In ‘On the Soul’ Brentano rejects Mental Holism and turns to a 
substance ontology of the mind. His argument is so far unconvincing. The substance 
ontology faces the same problem as Mental Monism; it does not solve it. However, he 
did not only posit a soul as a bearer of mental activities. He argued further that we 
experience the soul. This is a striking claim and if it were right, it would give us a 
good reason to address the Separability Challenge in the framework of substance 
ontology. But are mental substances objects of experience? 
 
9. Brentano counters Hume 
Hume reported his introspective findings as follows: 
 
I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe any thing but the perception. 
 
How can one argue against Hume that a mental substance is given to us in inner 
perception? Let us look closely at three passages arranged in chronological order that 
contain Brentano’s response to Hume: 
 
(A) If our I intuitively appears to us as thinking and willing, it appears to us 
with accidents, but someone would err who believes that the appearance 
would not contain a substance intuitively given. (Brentano 1903, 33; my 
translation) 
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(B) 1. The appearances of inner perception show us ourselves as a substance 
with mental accidents. These are seeing, hearing, conceptual thinking in 
manifold ways, judging, feeling, desiring, pleasure, anger etc. 
3. Perhaps one can add that they [the objects of inner perception] are 
distinguished in that they never appear without accidents while so-called outer 
perception only reveals substantial differences. […] 
4. In what is said lies that we never perceive our substance on its own, but that 
we perceive it inclusively [einschlussweise wahrnehmen] as soon as we have 
an inner perception. (Brentano 1907, 142-43; my translation) 
 
(C) [Aristotle] recognized completely correctly that if we apprehend ourselves 
as thinking things, we don’t apprehend our substance in isolation [für sich 
allein], but that we apprehend with it an accident, that in manifold changes 
belongs to our substance at one time and then not at another. (Brentano 
1912/3, 154 [117]) 
 
The gist of Brentano’s response to Hume is as follows: Fair enough David, I also 
never can catch myself at any time without a perception. But this does not exclude that 
I perceive myself only in combination with a perceiving. 16 
In order to see Brentano’s point consider the following analogy with object 
perception: 
 
I never see a house without any properties and I never see anything but 
properties. Hence, I never see a house. 
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The conclusion that we never see a house is certainly unwelcome. How come that 
most philosophers are happy to draw the parallel conclusion that we are never 
introspectively aware of a mental substance?  
 Part of the diagnosis of the mistake in the argument under discussion is that it 
assumes that in order to see a physical object one needs to see it ‘without any 
properties’. But how could one see an object without any of its properties or even as 
something that is distinct from its properties? A ‘bare particular’ is certainly not a 
visible thing. The same goes for introspection. If perception of myself requires 
perceiving a ‘bare self’, it cannot be done. The right response to this problem is to 
revise one’s view of what perceiving an object – in contrast to perceiving some 
features/properties/parts –consists in.  
Another part of the diagnosis is that Hume is concerned with introspection or 
observation. Introspecting is the intentional act of focusing attention on particular 
elements of one’s mental life. It is therefore unsurprising that in introspection only 
mental acts are given to us, we try to attend to them. The soul may not be an object of 
introspection, but, as Brentano argued, one can be aware of it together with other 
things.  
 
10. Perceiving the Soul 
Brentano argued that mental substances are given in consciousness together with 
mental accidents; physical substances are given in outer perception together with 
spatial and qualitative properties.17 Here is a representative quote: 
 
[1.] When a concrete, that is, localized coloured thing appears in intuition to 
us, it appears (and here I allow myself to correct an inconsequence of 
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Aristotle) nothing accidental, but a substance. The object that appears appears 
with colour and location but these appear not as accidents. Rather its spatial 
and qualitative determinations are to be conceived as its substantial 
differences which mutually individuate each other. And when our self 
intuitively appears to us as thinking and willing it appears to us with accidents. 
But we would be mistaken that the appearance did not contain a substance 
intuitively given. The substance is what bestows the individual difference on 
thinking and willing if there is another person that thinks and wills the same as 
we do. [2] The fact that the individualizing moment can be neither noticed nor 
characterized in its difference from the one that is given in the appearance of 
the other person who thinks and wills as we do is an obvious consequence of 
the limitation that all our mental perceptions concern only our own person. [3] 
But someone who denied that our perception of mental acts contained an 
individuating moment without its being noticed had to deny the truth that is 
accepted by all psychologists that every intuition, also inner intuition, is 
individual and for this reason deserves the name intuition and no longer the 
name general concept. (Brentano 1903, 32-33; my translation) 
  
First, outer perception and physical substances. We perceive a physical substance 
with those properties that individuate it and which mutually individuate each other. 
([1]) Please keep in mind here that for Brentano a yellow patch is a bona fide 
substance. The patch is individuated by its location and colour. The same colour patch 
could not be somewhere else and be differently coloured.18  It is jointly individuated 
by its location and qualities. 19 This yellow patch could not have had a different colour 
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and form at the time. When one perceives the yellow patch, one perceives it with its 
substantial differences. 
 Then, inner perception and mental substances. Brentano argued in ([3]) that 
while the combination of spatial location and quality individuates a physical 
substance, its mental activities do not individuate a mental substance. For instance, 
different thinkers may fear the same object at the same time. Mental substances 
individuate their accidents and not the other way round. For example, Marty states in 
his introductory lectures about descriptive psychology: 
 
Location and quality interpenetrate each other so to say, the one is the 
fundament of the other. There must be something that is connected in a 
similarly intimate manner with our states of consciousness yet which is not a 
state of consciousness but which is its fundament just as location and quality 
are in the realm of the physical.  
One may call this substance. (Marty 2011, 30; my translation) 
 
Let us accept for the purposes of our argument that the soul individuates mental 
activities: numerical difference of soul makes for numerical difference of mental act.  
 In (3) Brentano suggests the following argument: 
 
 (P3) The soul individuates mental acts. 
(P2) Particular mental acts can only be given in inner consciousness if what 
individuates them is also given in inner consciousness. 
 Therefore (C) The soul is given in inner awareness. 
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If the soul, the individuating principle of mental acts, is not given in inner 
consciousness, inner consciousness could only present us with types of mental acts 
that can be shared between different souls, but not particulars, or a particular totality 
of mental acts.  
I see no reason to follow Brentano here. In order to perceive a particular object 
a, it must appear distinct from its surroundings. An object can appear distinct from its 
surroundings in virtue of a number of contingent and non-individuating properties. I 
see the chameleon because of its striking colouring that contrasts with its 
environment, the giraffe because of its striking movement, but neither of these 
features make these animals what they are. If it is in general implausible that a feature 
that individuates a particular object a needs to be perceived in order to perceive a, 
why take this thesis to be true for inner consciousness? 
 Even if Brentano’s argument were convincing, its consequence would be 
deeply unsatisfactory. For although the mental substance is supposed to be perceived 
with its accidents, it cannot be noticed.20 Why? The reason is given in ([2]). In inner 
perception a unified whole is given to us whose parts are not articulated for us. We 
notice elements of the unified whole when there is a partial change in our mental life 
that creates a contrast. When we perceive first A and B together, then B and C 
together, where C and A are incompatible, this contrast makes A (or C) stand out. A 
(C) becomes noticeable and we can come to acknowledge A (C) as well as the whole 
it is part of.21 This conception of noticing sets limits to what can be noticed.22 If you 
lived in a world in which everything was blue, you could not compare and contrast 
blue with other colours. There would be no contrast cases and we can suppose that the 
inhabitants of the blue-only world cannot visually imagine any. According to 
Brentano, every one of us is in a similar situation with respect to the individuating 
	   33 
principle of his mental life; his soul. Because we are not conscious of the mental life 
of others, we cannot compare and contrast our mental activities with those of other 
thinkers and thereby come to notice the difference between our and their mental 
activities.  
 Imagine there is a super-chameleon in the scene you are now seeing. It is part 
of the scene, but it adapts so quickly that it can never be distinguished from its 
surroundings. The chameleon is in the visual scene before your eyes. But it is 
nomologically impossible for you to notice it. Your mental substance is like a super-
chameleon: it cannot be noticed when you are aware of it together with other things. 
For this reason we cannot come to form a positive conception of the soul. 
 Stumpf developed an objection along the same lines against Brentano’s theory 
of substance perception. Brentano proposed that a substance is part of each of its 
properties. I have set this idea so far aside. Stumpf framed his objections to Brentano 
in this terminology: 
 
It has not become clear to me how one is supposed to detect this part [the 
substance] that is contained in every property. Is it not a superfluous plus with 
respect to the perceivable facts? I don’t doubt that there are unnoticeable parts 
and unnoticeable changes of perceptual contents. But the archphenomenon 
from which we are supposed to abstract a concept has to stand out from the 
rest by noticeable distinctions or changes. It seems to me therefore that this X 
which is contained in all properties as part raises the same difficulties as 
Locke’s X that is added to all properties, at least if one, as Brentano always 
did, holds that all concepts are derived from intuitions. (Stumpf 1939, 41; my 
translation and emphasis) 
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I will not take a stand here on the question of whether physical substances are 
noticeable or not. But Stumpf’s objection applies directly to the perception of mental 
substances. Objects of experience are objects about which we can come to know by 
observing them and our concepts of them are, at least in part, formed by and acquired 
on the basis of such observations. For instance, a tree is something that looks and 
feels a certain way and behaves in observable ways under certain conditions. But even 
if our soul is co-perceived it cannot be observed. It does not stand in our 
consciousness and we cannot therefore explore it in consciousness. Brentano and 
Hume, then, agree that the soul cannot be observed.  
 In sum: Brentano has argued that Hume’s slogan ‘The soul is not given in 
inner perception’ is true if one understands it as saying that the soul is not given in 
isolation from its accidents in inner perception. So understood the slogan is not only 
true, but trivially true and therefore uninteresting. We get a true and interesting 
reading if we precisify the slogan to the thesis that the soul is given in inner 
perception together with its accidents. Although this thesis may be true, the soul still 
fails to be an object of experience in the sense we are interested in. For while the soul 
can be co-perceived, it cannot be noticed. But we need to notice it if inner perception 
is to be a source of knowledge of the soul.  
 To sum up: The soul is not a valuable posit and it is an object of experience 
only in a Pickwickian sense. But if one does one want to do without it and defend 
Mental Holism, one needs to answer the Separability Challenge in a new way. I will 
conclude the paper by suggesting such an alternative response. 
 
12. A Different Response to the Separability Challenge 
Let us take a closer look at Brentano’s intuitive motivation for separability: 
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What is meant when we talk in the second case [of simultaneous seeing and 
hearing] of two acts? Thereby we refer to the fact that one can stop without the 
other being disturbed in its unchanged continuation. I stop seeing the coloured 
when I close my eyes, but still hear the music; and vice versa, it becomes quiet 
and I still see what I saw previously. (Brentano 1954, 191; my translation and 
emphasis) 
 
Brentano made a case for separability via a temporal consideration. This is already 
problematic because Mental Holism states only that all mental acts at a time are 
conceptual parts of a unity. But let us set this aside for the moment. Brentano’s 
scenario is as follows: 
 
At t, Karl is hearing F and seeing blue & At t’, Karl continues hearing F, 
but has stopped seeing blue. 
 
It is important for Brentano’s consideration that seeing and hearing are processes 
that start, continue to go on, and stop. Such processes have temporal parts, or 
phases. The phases of one process may differ in various ways, yet still be phases 
of one process. The fact that one process stops while the other continues 
undisturbed leaves open the question of whether the phases of the processes are 
identical or not. For example, every phase of seeing blue could be identical to a 
phase of hearing F, but not vice versa as there are later phases of hearing F 
without seeing blue. This allows Brentano to hold that if at a time both seeing blue 
and hearing F ‘fall with self-evidence in the same consciousness’, they are ‘sides’ 
of the same presentation.23  
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 This observation is, however, not sufficient to meet the Separability 
Challenge. While Brentano did not put forth modal considerations to argue for 
separability, he could have done so. For is it not plausible to assume that while in 
fact Karl heard F and saw blue at t, he might have heard F and touched metal at t? 
Hence, hearing and seeing at t, the phases of a mental act, are separable and 
therefore distinct existences. 
 The key to meeting the Separability Challenge is the principle which gives 
rise to the challenge. When do we have a real and not merely a conceptual 
difference? Brentano’s answer, in more explicit form, was: 
 
(RealDifference) Given two concepts C1 and C2 that denote at most one object 
(event), if it is possible that C1 is satisfied without C2 being satisfied (and vice 
versa), the satisfier of C1 ≠ the satisfier of C2. 
 
Consider an example to see the intuition that makes (RealDifference) plausible. 
John’s seeing Hesperus at noon is the same event as John’s seeing Phosphorus at 
noon. This identity is not obvious because we conceive of the same event under 
different concepts, namely the concepts [John’s seeing Hesperus at noon] and [John’s 
seeing Phosphorus at noon]. If John’s seeing Hesperus at noon is the same event as 
John’s seeing Phosphorus at noon, it is impossible that John sees Phosphorus at noon 
without seeing Hesperus at noon (and vice versa). In turn, if it is possible that John 
sees x at time t without seeing y at time t, then x and y are really distinct.  
 However, (RealDifference) is implausible for objects or events that stand in 
multiple relations to some things and can be uniquely described in terms of a relation 
to one of these objects. This sounds rather abstract. So let us consider an example: the 
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brother of John might be no one else than the father of Jim. However, while Ted is in 
fact both, the brother of John and the father of Jim, he might have been only the 
brother of John and not also the father of Jim. This possibility does not show that the 
brother of John is a different person from the father of Jim: there are not two persons 
here. There is still only one person that satisfies two different concepts that relate the 
same person to two different people. 
Now, the concepts [S’s seeing blue at t] and [S’s hearing F at t] are just like 
[the brother of John] and [the father of Jim]. That is, different descriptions of the same 
thing that describe one object in terms of its different relations to two distinct objects. 
As we have seen, it is independently plausible that one and the same thing can satisfy 
different descriptions of this kind, although it is possible that it only satisfied one and 
not the other (at a time). Hence, [S’s seeing blue at t] and [S’s hearing F at t] can be 
satisfied by the same act and be mere conceptual parts of it, although the act might 
have satisfied only one of the concepts.  
 
Conclusion 
After Psychologie Brentano sided with Descartes against Hume because he convinced 
himself that some simultaneous mental acts are ‘distinct existences’ and not mere 
‘sides’ of one presentation. He reintroduced the soul to use the relation of substantial 
identity to tie these distinct existences together. However, the soul neither pulls its 
weight in the theory of consciousness nor is it an object of experience. Moreover, 
Brentano’s argument that separability implies real distinctness is unconvincing. 
Hence, Mental Holism seems still plausible. At any time, there is only one 
presentation and, for instance, seeing as well as consciousness of seeing are 
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abstractions from it. This view of the metaphysics of mind deserves more attention 
than Brentano himself has given it.24  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hume’s appeal to introspection has impressed upon a number of philosophers that 
one can’t have perceptual knowledge of a bearer of mental properties. A case in point 
is Kant (1783 § 48). Recent examples are Johnston (2007, 257) and Prinz (2012, 148). 
Chisholm 1969 is an exception that draws inspiration from Brentano’s later work. 
2 References are to the two-volume reprint of the 1925 edition of Psychologie edited 
by Oskar Kraus; page references for the English translation are in square brackets. 
3 Guillaume Frechétte (personal communication) takes the ms. to be written in the 
1870s. If this is right, Brentano changed his mind very soon after Psychologie. 
4 See Brentano (1907, 97). 
5 I have in part re-translated this passage. The original translation turned a sufficient 
condition into a necessary condition. 
6 For a detailed discussion of Brentano’s distinction between immanent and real 
object and its import see Sauer 2006 and Moran (1996, 7f). 
7 See Mackie (1997, 45). 
8 See Shaffer (2010, 47). 
9 See also Brentano (1928, 27-8). 
10 See also Hossack (2002, 126) and Armstrong (1968, 106). 
11 This challenge arises for all accounts that replace identity with ontological 
dependence or a similar relation. For example, Textor (2006 §5) faces this challenge. 
For discussion of similar problems see Weisberg 2008 and Kidd 2011. 
12 See also Brentano (1874 I, 198-199 [109]). 
13 See Brentano (1903, 31). 
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14 See Brentano (1912/3, 142). 
15 See Brentano (1907, 143). 
16 William James (1890, 299) pursues a similar line of thought: ‘It only meant that in 
the stream of consciousness it never was found all alone. But when it is found, it is 
felt; just as the body is felt, the feeling of which is also an abstraction, because never 
is the body felt all alone, but always together with other things.’ 
17 See, for example, Brentano (1912/3, 157). 
18 See Brentano (1890/1, 16 [19]). 
19 See Marty (2011, 30). 
20 See also Marty (1903, 34-5). 
21 See Brentano (1890/1, 55 [57]). 
22 See Brentano (1890/1, 61 [57]). 
23 See Tye (2007, 197) for a different response to the Separability Challenge. 
24 I would like to thank Giulia Felappi, Bob Hale, Uriah Kriegel and Eliot Michaelson 
for comments that led to significant changes of the paper and to Jon Barton for 
discussions about Brentano’s argument. I am grateful to Guillaume Frechétte for 
bringing Brentano’s manuscript ‘Von der Seele’ to my attention and making the 
transcription available. Many thanks to Denis Fisette for providing me with Koffka’s 
transcript of Stumpf’s lectures. 
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